Abstract: This article explores whether and in what sense there is a "United Nations policy," a topic unexplored in the literature. The UN's universal character provides legitimacy, a precious asset in formulating global public policy. It is thus the forum of choice for regime negotiation and norm promotion for contested contemporary challenges, reflecting its comparative advantage and its unique ability to formulate policies that aspire to universal application and relevance. This essay explores the UN's particular contribution to global problem-solving for terrorism, sustainability, and controlling pandemics in order to show, through these three illustrations, how the United Nations contributes to the advance or retreat of global governance.
that can impose the death penalty (Simons, 2004) . Similarly, in his report on transitional justice, he again affirmed that the United Nations would not establish or participate "in any tribunal for which capital punishment is included among possible sanctions" (Annan, 2004: Para. 64d ).
1
As is further defined below, "policy" refers to the statement of principles and actions that an organization is likely to pursue in the event of particular contingencies. It is in this sense, for example, that we are given copies of our insurance "policy" documents for our house and cars. Thus, the UN policy might be to promote awareness But whose preferred political morality is this? What proportion of the world's people live under governments that have capital punishment on their statutes, including China, India, Indonesia, and the United States? Who sets the relevant international standards and benchmarks? Does the United Nations somehow have a state of grace above its member states? Most pertinently for present purposes, what does this say about "UN policy" as such? It could be argued that UN policy is to oppose the death penalty, and that the refusal to provide technical assistance that could result in the death sentence being imposed was implementation of the policy. But equally, it could be argued that opposition to capital punishment is a global norm and a refusal to provide training that could lead to the death penalty was the expression of that norm.
1 As in national decision-making, the Secretary-General would seek and receive advice from a variety and range of sources: the different relevant departments in the Secretariat in New York, in this case including but not limited to the Office of Legal Affairs, the Department of Political Affairs, the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, which includes the Strategic Planning Unit; from trusted individual advisers, including in particular those in the Executive Office and the Deputy Secretary-General (Louise Frechette) and the Chef de Cabinet (Iqbal Riza); and interested and concerned UN entities and officials outside the Secretariat drawn from the global UN system, including but not limited to the Geneva-based High Commissioner for Human Rights and, especially, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq. Again as in national systems, each bureaucratic unit would also involve a number of sub-units and individuals in drawing up its briefs and recommendations. The various briefs and points of view would be submitted to executive committees that group cognate departments, like the executive Committee on Peace and Security, as well as the Secretary-General's "cabinet." The extensive consultative process notwithstanding, on any significant policy issue the final decision was very much that of Kofi Annan. This description is based on the personal experience of one of the co-authors who worked directly with Kofi Annan as the principal writer of his second reform report in 2002. about the gravity and causes of HIV/AIDS, encourage educational campaigns by member governments, reject participation by HIV-positive personnel in UN operations, and declare zero tolerance of sexual exploitation by UN peacekeepers.
Policy needs to be distinguished both from norms and institutions. A norm can be defined statistically to mean the pattern of behavior that is most common or usual-or the "normal curve" that represents a widely prevalent pattern of behavior. Alternatively, it can be defined ethically to mean a pattern of behavior that should be followed in accordance with a given value system, the moral code of a society, or a generally accepted standard of proper behavior. In some instances, the two meanings may converge in practice; in other cases, they diverge; but for most of the time, they will complement each other. In the Ottawa Treaty banning landmines, norm generation by Western middle powers was underpinned by norm-advocacy from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and reinforced by norm-promoting standard-setting by the UN Secretary-General when he endorsed the Ottawa process as the negotiating track and the convention that resulted from it (Hubert, 2000; Price, 1998; Thakur and Maley, 1999) . A relatively recent effort at UN norm-building was the Global Compact that grew from the 2000 Millennium Summit (Ruggie, 2001 (Ruggie, , 2007 .
With growing awareness that a new problem is serious enough to warrant attention by the international policy community of states, new norms in which the newly acquired knowledge is embedded need to be articulated, disseminated, and institutionalized. For example, once we know that HIV/AIDS is transmitted through unprotected promiscuous sexual activity, the norm of safe sex follows logically. As a universal organization, the United Nations is an ideal forum to seek consensus about normative approaches that govern global problems and would work best with a worldwide application of a norm. The host of problems ranging from reducing acid rain to impeding money laundering to halting pandemics clearly provide instances for which universal norms and approaches are emerging. At the same time, the UN can be a frustrating forum because dissent by powerful states or even coalitions of less powerful ones means either no action, or agreement only on a lowest common denominator. A particularly good illustration of this is the difficulty in operationalizing the norm for each individual state has the "responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity" as agreed to by heads of government meeting at the 2005 World Summit (Thakur, 2006; Weiss, 2007) .
If policy is to escape the trap of being ad hoc, episodic, judgmental, and idiosyncratic, it must be housed within an institutional context. 2 2 We use "institution" here in two senses of the term: both formal, organizational entities as well as regimes, or recurring and stable patterns of behavior around which actor expectations converge (Keohane, 1989) . For example, the "coalition of the willing" and the Proliferation Security Initiative are stable patterns even though the membership is variable. It is easier to identify formal institutions that have treaties and budgets, but the messier and more informal variety are just as essential to our analysis.
If there is a relatively well-known problem or a range of agreed-upon policy, what is the machinery that will put such a policy into effect? For example, one may have determined that democratic states are less likely to go to war with one another and that increasing their numbers is valuable, and hence a policy could be announced to hold elections after peace has broken out in a protracted armed conflict. However, this has little meaning unless there are also institutions such as a local election commission along with outside observers to register voters and to arrange for poll workers, polling stations, printing of ballots, verification of rolls, and tallying of results. Institutions that are most effective often are those that deal with well-known areas with well-embedded norms and consensus among member states: the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Health Organization (WHO), to name but two. Many issues treated by such organizations are seen as having little controversial political content-there is nothing in them that has an impact on a state's interests, and that would therefore lead to conflict. Hence, these issues can safely be turned over to experts for resolution.
In this article, we initiate a long overdue conversation on the subject of "UN policy." First, we speculate as to whether and, if yes, in what sense there is such a thing.
Second, as the world organization's comparative advantage is its unique ability to formulate policies that aspire to universal application, we highlight this particular contribution to global problem-solving through a range of selected prominent contemporary issues (terrorism; sustainability; and controlling pandemics) to show how the UN has or has not filled them as part of the advance and retreat of global governance.
What UN Policy?
The universal character of the United Nations provides the kind of legitimacy that is a precious asset in formulating global public policy. Yet, who are the actors-the relevant policy-makers-in the UN system? Is "international" policy made and implemented by international organizations or by national authorities meeting and interacting in international forums? To what extent has the evident policy paralysis over Darfur been the result of a policy gap on the part of the UN as opposed to weak political will among key member states? Such an approach can lead to fragmented, incompatible policies that can become more incoherent over time. How well suited is the United Nations to determine the ends of policy, or to guide the processes by which it is made?
The literature on international institutions provides familiar answers. To realists, international organizations like the UN are creations and tools of sovereign states, and as such, cannot be independent actors. Likewise, to traditional liberal institutionalists, the UN is an arena in which interactions among its member states take place and cooperation can be agreed. Finally, to classic principal-agent theorists, states are the principals and UN secretariats are the agents, and much of the focus is on the absolute power over international civil servants by member states that pay their salaries. As one critic explains, "P-A theory posits that the ability of the Principal to 'sanction' an Agent by changing the contract (firing or not reappointing the Agent, rewriting contractual terms to undercut the Agent's realm of authority, or cutting the Agent's budget) provides states with significant political leverage that they can use to rein in Agents who go astray" (Alter, 2008: 34) .
In short, to all the above, the notion of a "UN policy" that is not reflective of the preferences and interests of the states does not seem to make any sense; but this discussion of the policy-making function of the United Nations exposes four substantial weaknesses in this rather old-fashioned view, all of which suggest rather more autonomy for agents in making policy than is commonly thought. First, recent works using a revised and more nuanced version of principal-agent theory and constructivism suggest that international organizations, including UN specialized agencies, have significant (although incomplete) autonomies vis-à-vis their principals (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004; Hawkins, Lake, Nielson, and Tierney, 2006; Nielson and Tierney, 2003; Pollack, 2003; Reinalda and Verbeek, 2004) . Second, there are multiple sources of funding for activities by UN organizations so that, at a minimum, there is a deeply symbiotic relationship between the principals and the agents; as supposedly all the principals broadly support the objectives of less conflict and more cooperation, UN officials can seek allies and funding from a variety of sources. Third, with the retreat of the state in an age of globalization, there is more "space" available for the UN organizations because, as Janice Gross Stein (2008: 127) argues, "a principal-agent relationship looks somewhat like domestic publicprivate and public-voluntary partnerships… States no longer row, they steer."
Finally and perhaps most importantly, in discussing UN policy, there are "three UNs" and not merely one. Beginning with Inis Claude (1956 Claude ( , 1996 , analysts of international organization usually identify two United Nations, one comprised of member states and a second comprised of the secretariats. A third UN should be added to our analytical toolkits, comprised of actors that are closely associated with the world organization but not formally part of it (Weiss, Carayannis, and Jolly, 2009 ). This "outside-insider" UN includes nongovernmental organizations, academics, consultants, experts, independent commissions, and other groups of individuals. These informal networks often help to affect shifts in ideas, policies, priorities, and practices that are initially seen as undesirable or problematic by state principals and even international secretariats. As any contemporary student of the organization soon discovers, all three United Nations are essential to contemporary policy formulation by the world organization.
According to a standard reference, a policy is not only a governing principle but also "the decision to embark upon certain programs of action (or inaction) in order to achieve desired goals" (Evans and Newnham, 1998: 440) . It is an intended course of action or inaction in light of a particular problem (Birkland, 2005: 17-18; Brown and Ganguly, 1997) . This necessarily entails both agency and purposive action. State actors are policy-makers. But for states, public policy is usually distinguished from foreign policy, implying a boundary-based, domestic/external separation between the two activities. "The policy-makers and the policy system therefore stand at these junction points and seek to mediate between the various milieux" (Evans and Newnham, 1998: 179) . By contrast, "the UN, through its organs such as the Security Council or the General Assembly, makes policy" (Evans and Newnham, 1998: 440) , but it cannot be said to make foreign policy. Neither the policy-makers nor the policy system of the United Nations are engaged in boundary activities. By definition the world is their stage.
The civil service may shape and influence policy, but is not normally considered to be a policy-maker: that is the domain of the political heads of civil service departments, cabinet ministers individually and the legislature and political executive collectively. Likewise, the UN Secretariat and its staff members-international civil servants-may influence policy but they cannot be described as policy-makers. To the extent that in important respects the Secretary-General and other senior officials can be called independent actors in their own right (Ramcharan, 2008; Thakur, 2006) , they may on some occasions be classified as peripatetic policy-makers. Thus, UN "policymakers" are indeed the principal political organs-the Security Council and the General Assembly-and the member states collectively. But all of these are intergovernmental forums. That is, the people making the decisions in the form of adopting resolutions that set out new governing principles, articulate goals, and authorize programs of action to achieve those goals, do so as delegates of national governments from the UN's member states. Moreover, they do so only within the governing framework of their national foreign policies, under strict and narrow instructions from capitals.
The UN's ability to consult widely beyond states (the First UN) plays a substantial part in its ability to formulate operational ideas: the recommendations for specific policies, institutional arrangements, and regimes that follow after identifying and diagnosing a problem and developing a norm to help codify desirable changes in behavior and approach. This is a function that is quintessentially in the job descriptions of the "Second United Nations," staff of international secretariats often complemented by trusted consultants and expert groups in the "Third UN" Jolly, Emmerij, and Weiss, 2009) . And the discussion and dissemination often occurs in public forums and global conferences (Schechter, 2005; Weiss, Carayannis, Emmerij, and Jolly, 2005 : Chapters 9-11). Indeed, this is why the world organization has a comparative advantage in formulating policies for universal consideration and adaptation.
At the national level, policy can be used to refer holistically to "the entire package of actions and attitudes" (Hill, 2001 : 290)-for instance, Indian or U.S. policy.
Alternatively, it can also be applied to specific policies toward this or that state in foreign affairs-for example, Indian or U.S. policy toward Israel-Palestinian relations, the International Criminal Court, nuclear proliferation-or to this or that issue in domestic affairs-for example, Indian or U.S. policy on the death penalty, intellectual property, immigration.
Policy may also be broken down sequentially into three separate phasesformulation, adoption, and implementation. And its object varies: to regulate services like transport, telecommunications, public utilities; to allocate public resources like housing, employment, scholarships; and to redress social inequality through social welfare programs (Morris, 2001: 703) . As distinct from state actors, the responsibility for implementation of most UN policy does not rest primarily with the United Nations itself but with its member states. But even UN policy, in the form of policy resolutions and actions adopted and authorized by the Security Council and the General Assembly or summit decisions made by member states directly, may exhibit regulative, distributive, and redistributive characteristics.
Based on these considerations, resolutions adopted by the General Assemblythough not legally binding-are the equivalent of policy declarations if they articulate broad principles and goals, sometimes with programs of action to attain these goals. 
International Terrorism
The UN's primary purpose, as set out in the Charter, is the maintenance of international peace and security, but trying to develop policies within the UN system for a topic as contested as terrorism is anything but simple. An elusive definition gives one key to the problems afflicting efforts to devise common "policies" to combat and uproot terrorism.
The threat of international terrorism has been addressed internationally both within the framework of international law and specific UN resolutions and measures. In the Corfu Channel Case in 1949, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) affirmed "every State's obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States" (Sahović and Bishop, 1968: 316) . There are thirteen global, seven regional, and three related global treaties for combating terrorism , (6) 1970s, terrorism in UN circles was viewed largely as a local phenomenon. As the frequency, violence, and reach of terrorist incidents began to expand, the General Assembly seemed to be as interested in understanding and rationalizing terrorism as in suppressing it, while the Security Council was more exercised by the counter-terrorism tactics of Israel and the United States than by the acts of terrorism themselves (Luck, 2004: 98) . This reflected the changed composition of the overall UN membership in the aftermath of the decolonization of Asia and Africa in particular from European rule, the reality of many armed national liberation movements that had resorted to acts that many Western governments condemned as terrorism, 5 The day after 9/11, both the Security Council and the General Assembly adopted resolutions strongly condemning the acts of terrorism and urging all states to cooperate to bring the perpetrators, organizers, and sponsors of 9/11 to justice. Security Council resolution 1368 was the first to incorporate acts against terrorism into the right of selfdefense. In doing so, the council effectively provided a blank check to Washington and sidelined itself from oversight of the measures taken in response. Two weeks later, Security Council resolution 1373, adopted under Chapter VII, imposed significant requirements on member states within their domestic jurisdictions and expanded the council's oversight role in relation to them. "This posed a remarkable dichotomy. The Security Council chooses to exercise no control or oversight on the use of military force in response to terrorism but is vigilant and arguably intrusive when it comes to dealing with terrorism through national mechanisms and controls" 11). Moreover, because neither "self-defense" nor "terrorism" is defined or selfexplanatory, the result "compounds the [unlimited] expansiveness of the mandate" (Boulden and Weiss, 2004: 11-12) .
Security Council resolution 1540 of April 2004 broke new conceptual ground in formulating a policy directing sovereign states to enact nonproliferation legislation.
Affirming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) as a threat to international peace and security-which kicks in the binding-on-all collective enforcement Chapter VII of the UN Charter-and expressing concern over the threat of WMDs terrorism and of illicit trafficking in such material, weapons, and delivery systems, this resolution obliged states to enact and enforce laws to prohibit nonstate actors to develop, acquire, transfer or use WMDs; to take and enforce effective domestic control, physical protection, accounting and border control measures to prevent proliferation; and to set up a committee of the whole to oversee implementation of the resolution.
The unprecedented intrusion into national law-making authority can be read as the toughened new determination to take effective action. But it was not without controversy:
"the UN Charter makes no provision for the Council to engage in such global lawmaking, and the imposition of such obligations runs counter to the principle that international law is based on the consent of states" (Burroughs, 2007: 32) . A former member of the UN/OAU Expert Group on the Denuclearization of Africa noted that "by arrogating to itself wider powers of legislation," the Security Council departed from its Charter-based mandate, and that excessive recourse to Chapter VII could signal a preference for coercion over cooperation (Mohammad, 2004) . Framing the resolution within the global war against terrorism was meant to silence dissenting voices. And the council's effort to seek global adherence to its resolutions was undermined by its unrepresentative composition and the veto power of the five permanent members (P-5) (Mohammad, 2004) . Many NGOs too criticized the resolution's silence on the role of disarmament in promoting nonproliferation, as well as the Security Council's effort to transform itself into a world legislature (Wurst, 2004) . In short, these fledgling policy steps have had consequences even if there is no operational capacity to ensure implementation. Moreover, currently member states are negotiating a fourteenth international treaty, a draft comprehensive convention on international terrorism that would complement the existing framework of international anti-terrorism instruments and build on the key guiding principles already present in the existing thirteen anti-terrorist conventions: the importance of criminalization of terrorist offences, making them punishable by law and calling for prosecution or extradition of the perpetrators; the need to eliminate legislation which establishes exceptions to such criminalization on political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or similar hostage taking, bombing civilians, procuring nuclear materials, and financing terrorist activities. While they do not address the totality of terrorist acts within one comprehensive normative or institutional framework, they do constitute a significant body of policies to which states can aspire.
grounds; a strong call for member states to take action to prevent terrorist acts; and emphasis on the need for member states to cooperate, exchange information and provide each other with the greatest measure of assistance in connection with the prevention, investigation and prosecution of terrorist acts.
In his report, Annan (2005: Para. 88 ) outlined five policy pillars of a counterterrorism strategy: dissuasion of people from resorting to or supporting terrorism; denial of access to funds and materials to terrorists; deterrence of states from sponsoring terrorism; capacity development so states can defeat terrorism; and defense of human The United Nations has become the forum of choice for regime negotiation and norm promotion in countering international terrorism, one of the most contested contemporary policy issues. Indeed, the establishment of a regime through an interlocking collection of treaties and conventions is one of the more powerful achievements of the UN system over the past decade. To be sure, it lacks enforcement capacity, but it can promulgate and promote the normative and legal framework of a counter-terrorism regime. It can also be the coordinating forum for counter-terrorism efforts by states, regional organizations, and technical agencies like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). With respect to biological and chemical weapons, the UN could be the central coordinator and clearing house for information, aligning the work of national and functional agencies; and a clearing house for the global stockpiling and distribution of drugs and vaccines in a global crisis. Just as importantly, the world organization with its multitude of offices, funds, programs, and specialized agencies, is also the forum of choice for attacking the "conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism including prolonged unresolved conflicts, dehumanization of victims of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, lack of the rule of law and violations of human rights, ethnic, national and religious discrimination, political exclusion, socioeconomic marginalization and lack of good governance" (United Nations, UN Action to Counter Terrorism, 2008).
From Sustainable Development to Climate Change
One of the biggest contemporary global policy gaps concerns the redistribution of the benefits of growth. The litany of policies that emerged as part of the "dialogue of the deaf" in the mid-1970s would provide an intriguing illustration of policy gaps that remain gigantic to this day. Rather than going down this well-trodden path of the collapse of the new international economic order (NIEO), however, it would provide more insights about moving toward policy relevance to explore the ever-changing dynamics of policy gaps on the protection of the human environment by returning to the "Earth Summit" of June where their political participation in a parallel "forum" was a first in international conferencing techniques. In addition, the end of the Cold War facilitated the burgeoning of civil society throughout the socialist bloc and many parts of the developing world.
NGOs mobilized public opinion around the world and were able to shape to a large extent Agenda 21 (the final product of Rio). The Rio Declaration in many ways consummated the key ideas put on the table by the meeting of experts at Founex in 1971. In short, steps were taken to fill the policy gaps by moving toward defining the content of a global partnership between developing and more industrialized countries based on mutual needs and common interests in order to make possible a healthier future for the planet.
Of course, the range of environmental issues had evolved in the twenty years between Stockholm and Rio. Global problems were agreed to include the ozone layer and global warming, tropical deforestation, the biosphere, and problems of permanent sovereignty of resources-all this in the framework of sustainable development.
However, the North-South divide had not changed significantly: northern countries sought legal obligations to protect the environment from harmful development policies, while southern governments continued to see this as a threat to their national sovereignty and a menacing limitation on their economic growth possibilities (Schechter, 2005: 119) .
Agenda 21 "set international and national objectives and provided programmatic suggestions on how to fulfill those objectives" (Schechter, 2005: 121) . With more than 1,000 specific policy recommendations in areas as widely diverse as desertification and poverty eradication, Michael Schechter (2005: 157) goes on to explain that although Agenda 21 led to the more systematic consideration of sustainable development within the UN system, it has not been used as such by national governments; in fact, it has "failed to serve as a useful guide to action."
The most recent consolidation of attempts to frame and pursue sustainable The Holy See (Vatican), not a UN member state, is an actor in world affairs as an independent legal entity and in that capacity has formal observer status at the United Nations.
) have increased from 24 at inception and have phased out more than 95 percent of ozone-depleting substances, and the earth's protective ozone layer is estimated to return to pre-1980 levels by 2075 (Ozone Secretariat, 2008) The case for environmental protection no longer rests on a lack of knowledge about a threat or the lack of empirical data. It now rests on the policy gap between the efficacy of two opposing ideologies, neo-liberal economics and sustainable development. After the deadline for an agreement had been reached, 187 states present (including China and the United States) unexpectedly resumed talks on the global effort to rescue the planet from climate change, which culminated in the so-called Bali roadmap. Deep concessions were made so that the United States would sign on, yet the United States still had serious concerns about the inadequacy of responsibilities assigned to developing countries, while Russia, Canada, and Japan also objected to some of the agreement's key aspects. Meanwhile the G-77 and some NGOs were disappointed at the lackluster final text. Indeed, the ambassador of Grenada described the outcome as "so watered-down" that "there was no need for 12,000 people to gather…in Bali. We could have done that by email" (Quoted in Jowit et al, 2007) . 
Controlling Pandemics
The international community can readily call on the experience of a successful campaign to eradicate a major killer disease when the norm of eradication is accepted, the political will is mustered, and the necessary financial, organization resources are fully mobilized.
The elimination of smallpox is perhaps the most spectacular illustration of why having a normative consensus, solid knowledge, and sensible policy is essential. For more than 3,000 years, smallpox was a scourge of humankind, feared for its high fatality-often 10 percent of all deaths each year-and for the pockmarks which disfigured those who survived. In the early 1950s-a century and a half after the introduction of vaccinationan estimated 50 million cases of smallpox occurred in the world each year, a figure which fell to around 10-15 million by 1967 because of vaccination (WHO, Fact Sheet/Smallpox, 2008) , of whom some 2 million people succumbed to the disease in that year (Fenner et al., 1998; Black, 1986 ). Lest we forget, the WHO is a specialized agency of the UN system.
In 1953, the WHO's first director-general, Brock Chisholm, made an unsuccessful attempt to persuade the World Health Assembly-the WHO's governing body-to undertake a global program for smallpox eradication. Five years later, a Soviet delegate persuaded the WHO to accept responsibility for a global program-but only minimal funds were provided. The organization itself was preoccupied with a major and eventually unsuccessful effort to eradicate malaria, and many were skeptical about the feasibility of smallpox eradication, especially in Africa.
In 1966, the World Health Assembly agreed on an Intensified Smallpox Eradication Program (ISEP)-though still with doubts about its success. At that time, the entire staff numbered just over 3,300 persons, and only about 150 professionals were available to oversee smallpox programs in more than fifty countries.
Once started, the program advanced rapidly. A strategic plan concentrated on mass vaccination campaigns, using freeze dried vaccines of quality assessed by special teams. A surveillance system was set up to detect and investigate cases and contain outbreaks. Three principles were critically important. First, all countries would need to participate, with some form of regional and global coordination. Second, programs would need to be flexible and adapted to the specifics of each country. Finally, ongoing research, in the field and the laboratory, would be needed to evaluate progress and solve problems as they arose.
By the early 1970s, smallpox was on the retreat. A surveillance containment strategy was developed, sending flying squad teams wherever a possible case was discovered. The squads would make a diagnosis, identify and vaccinate all contacts, and swiftly contain the spread of infection. By 1975, the number of countries where the disease could still be found had fallen from 30 to 3-India, Bangladesh, and Ethiopia. By the end of the year, the last case of variola major, the most serious form of the disease, was reported in Bangladesh.
Attention then turned to Ethiopia, where the last case was reported in August 1976-but not before nomads had carried the disease across the border into Somalia, where an epidemic occurred in mid-1977. In October, the last case, of variola minor, was finally reported in Somalia. Three years later, the WHO declared victory. The total cost of the 11-year effort had been around $300 million, one third of which came from international sources and two thirds from the countries affected. The total cost was the equivalent at the time of three fighter-bombers. Saved lives is an impressive variable for some, and even hard-headed accountants have to be impressed by the purely economic benefits of the implementation of the policy. Because of eradication, the world now saves at least $2 billion each year by avoiding the purchase of smallpox vaccine, administration To date, the HIV/AIDS pandemic-and the near misses with SARS and avian flu-have reflected a different approach from that of smallpox and polio. Of course, the clarity of understanding regarding the virology and epidemiology of smallpox was a precondition for its eradication. Nonetheless, the early embrace of cooperation and transnational interests and a normative agenda rather than going it alone on a national basis also was essential. The HIV/AIDS story is one of waking up after the disaster has struck and of proceeding with minimal international cooperation.
The response by Western governments was initially sluggish but then reasonably effective once the urgency and magnitude of the crisis was fully grasped. The response by African governments was and often remained one of denial, evasion, and resort to conspiracy theories. The UN system's response demonstrates a disconnect between the swelling international bureaucracy and results obtained in the field. Yet it is the UN system that aggressively promotes the ethic of a comprehensive response to get ahead of the epidemic: HIV prevention efforts should be intensified and scaled up while Such is not the case in Africa, which has been the main theater where this particular tragedy has played out. Because of the inadequacies already detailed above, the disease has cross-infected the heterosexual population in general and is still spreading more widely. In 2007, 22.5 million sub-Saharan Africans were believed to be HIVpositive and another 1.7 million were being infected each year as well (UNAIDS and WHO, AIDS Epidemic Update, 2007).
The international AIDS industry often privileges the goal of capturing more funding and meeting donor priorities than effective problem solving in the countries and populations in need and at risk. For example, unlike the worldwide industry behind the distribution of condoms as an AIDS prevention policy, there is no multimillion industry and bureaucracy to profit from and so no support for a policy of single partner sexual fidelity and abstinence-a policy of "zero grazing" that was remarkably successful in Uganda.
The World Bank's HIV/AIDS policy is set out in a handbook that embraces "managing for results" (governance by slogan is an incurable ailment of international organizations) (Global HIV/AIDS Monitoring and Evaluation Team, 2007) . This 
Conclusion
That the stage of international relations is occupied by several actors has become so commonplace an observation as to be trite. Actors have policies. International organizations (IGOs) are one type of the numerous actors playing diverse roles in world affairs, and the United Nations is a key IGO actor. The question of whether the world organization can be said to have any policies is theoretically intriguing and yet, surprisingly, so far largely unaddressed in the literature. Part of the exploration must include the question of the conceptual and theoretical boundaries between norms, laws and policies, and how the three are inter-related.
As noted earlier, we hope to begin a conversation among scholars and practitioners on the subject. To that end, this article suggests that in the three key issue areas discussed above, a compendium of UN policies would include:
• Dissuasion of people from resorting to or supporting terrorism;
• Denial of access to funds and materials to terrorists;
• Deterrence of states from sponsoring terrorism;
• Capacity development so states can defeat terrorism;
• Defense of human rights even when hunting down terrorists;
• Promotion of economic growth to satisfy the aspirations of the present generation without compromising the needs of future generations or irreversibly damaging the environment and the ecosystem;
• Promotion of economic growth in the poorest countries through technical and financial assistance and concessionary terms of trade in various iterations of partnerships of development;
• Protection of the ozone layer through the Montreal Protocol;
• Deceleration, halt and reversal of global warming through the Kyoto Protocol, the UNFCCC and successor regimes and agreements;
• Eradication of smallpox and polio; and
• Control of the HIV/AIDS pandemic through the three-track strategy of prevention, treatment and education.
For all of these issue areas, the universal UN system has made solid use of its unique legitimacy and helped initiate steps toward the formulation of coherent global policies.
While the policy glass is more than half full, when key member states turn recalcitrant, clearly the implementation one is close to empty. That remains the fundamental reality of global governance in a state-centric world.
